Art and Interpretation

picture of man looking at art objectsInterpretation in fine art refers to the attribution of pregnant to a work. A point on which people often disagree is whether the artist'due south or author'south intention is relevant to the interpretation of the work. In the Anglo-American analytic philosophy of fine art, views about estimation branch into two major camps: intentionalism and anti-intentionalism, with an initial focus on one fine art, namely literature.

The anti-intentionalist maintains that a work's meaning is entirely determined by linguistic and literary conventions, thereby rejecting the relevance of the author's intention. The underlying assumption of this position is that a work enjoys autonomy with respect to significant and other aesthetically relevant properties. Extra-textual factors, such as the author's intention, are neither necessary nor sufficient for significant decision. This early position in the analytic tradition is often called conventionalism considering of its strong emphasis on convention. Anti-intentionalism gradually went out of favor at the stop of the 20th century, but it has seen a revival in the and so-called value-maximizing theory, which recommends that the interpreter seek value-maximizing interpretations constrained by convention and, according to a different version of the theory, by the relevant contextual factors at the time of the piece of work's production.

Past contrast, the initial brand of intentionalism—actual intentionalism—holds that interpreters should business themselves with the author'due south intention, for a work'southward significant is affected by such intention. There are at to the lowest degree iii versions of actual intentionalism. The absolute version identifies a work'southward meaning fully with the author'due south intention, therefore allowing that an author tin intend her work to mean whatever she wants it to mean. The extreme version acknowledges that the possible meanings a work can sustain accept to be constrained by convention. According to this version, the author's intention picks the correct meaning of the piece of work as long as information technology fits one of the possible meanings; otherwise, the piece of work ends up being meaningless. The moderate version claims that when the author's intention does non match any of the possible meanings, meaning is fixed instead by convention and maybe as well context.

A 2d brand of intentionalism, which finds a middle course between bodily intentionalism and anti-intentionalism, is hypothetical intentionalism. According to this position, a work's meaning is the appropriate audience's all-time hypothesis well-nigh the author's intention based on publicly available data about the author and her work at the time of the piece's production. A variation on this position attributes the intention to a hypothetical author who is postulated by the interpreter and who is constituted by work features. Such authors are sometimes said to exist fictional because they, being purely conceptual, differ decisively from flesh-and-blood authors.

This article elaborates on these theories of interpretation and considers their notable objections. The debate well-nigh interpretation covers other fine art forms in add-on to literature. The theories of interpretation are besides extended across many of the arts. This broad outlook is assumed throughout the article, although cypher said is affected fifty-fifty if a narrow focus on literature is adopted.

Table of Contents

  1. Fundamental Concepts: Intention, Meaning, and Estimation
  2. Anti-Intentionalism
    1. The Intentional Fallacy
    2. Beardsley'southward Speech Act Theory of Literature
    3. Notable Objections and Replies
  3. Value-Maximizing Theory
    1. Overview
    2. Notable Objections and Replies
  4. Actual Intentionalism
    1. Absolute Version
    2. Extreme Version
    3. Moderate Version
    4. Objections to Actual Intentionalism
  5. Hypothetical Intentionalism
    1. Overview
    2. Notable Objections and Replies
  6. Hypothetical Intentionalism and the Hypothetical Artist
    1. Overview
    2. Notable Objections and Replies
  7. Decision
  8. References and Further Reading

1. Key Concepts: Intention, Meaning, and Interpretation

It is common for us to ask questions about works of art due to puzzlement or curiosity. Sometimes we do non understand the point of the work. What is the point of, for instance, Metamorphosis past Kafka or Duchamp'southward Fountain? Sometimes there is ambiguity in a work and we want it resolved. For case, is the final sequence of Christopher Nolan's film Inception reality or another dream? Or do ghosts really be in Henry James's The Plow of the Screw? Sometimes we make hypotheses about details in a work. For instance, does the woman in white in Raphael's The School of Athens stand for Hypatia? Is the conch in William Golding'due south Lord of the Flies a symbol for civilisation and democracy?

What these questions have in common is that all of them seek after things that go beyond what the work literally presents or says. They are all concerned with the implicit contents of the work or, for simplicity, with the meanings of a piece of work. A distinction tin can be drawn between ii kinds of pregnant in terms of scope. Meaning tin be global in the sense that information technology concerns the work's theme, thesis, or betoken. For instance, an audience showtime encountering Duchamp's Fountain would want to know Duchamp's point in producing this readymade or, put otherwise, what the work as a whole is made to convey. The aforementioned goes for Kafka's Metamorphosis, which contains so bizarre a plot as to brand the reader wonder what the story is all about. Meaning tin can also be local insofar equally it is about what a part of a work conveys. Inquiries into the meaning of a item sequence in Christopher Nolan's moving picture, the adult female in Raphael's fresco, or the conch in William Golding'due south Lord of the Flies are directed at simply part of the work.

We are said to exist interpreting when trying to observe out answers to questions about the meaning of a work. In other words, interpretation is the attempt to aspect work-meaning. Here "attribute" can hateful "recover," which is retrieving something already existing in a piece of work; or it can more than weakly mean "impose," which entails ascribing a significant to a work without ontologically creating anything. Many of the major positions in the contend endorse either the impositional view or the retrieval view.

When an interpretative question arises, a frequent mode to bargain with it is to resort to the creator'southward intention. We may enquire the artist to reveal her intention if such an opportunity is available; we may also check what she says about her work in an interview or autobiography. If we have admission to her personal documents such as diaries or letters, they besides will become our interpretative resources. These are all testify of the artist's intention. When the evidence is compelling, nosotros have expert reason to believe it reveals the artist's intention.

Certainly, there are cases in which external evidence of the creative person's intention is absent, including when the work is anonymous. This poses no difficulty for philosophers who view appeal to artistic intention as crucial, for they accept that internal testify—the work itself—is the best bear witness of the artist's intention. Near of the time, close attention to details of the work will pb us to what the artist intended the work to mean.

But what is intention exactly? Intention is a kind of mental country normally characterized as a design or plan in the artist's mind to be realized in her artistic creation. This crude view of intention is sometimes refined into the reductive analysis one will find in a contemporaneous textbook of philosophy of mind: intention is constituted by conventionalities and desire. Some bodily intentionalists explain the nature of intention from a Wittgensteinian perspective: authorial intention is viewed every bit the purposive structure of the piece of work that tin be discerned by close inspection. This view challenges the supposition that intentions are always private and logically independent of the piece of work they cause, which is often interpreted as a position held by anti-intentionalists.

A 2005 proposal holds that intentions are executive attitudes toward plans (Livingston). These attitudes are firm but defeasible commitments to acting on them. Contra the reductive analysis of intention, this view holds that intentions are singled-out and real mental states that serve a range of functions irreducible to other mental states.

Clarifying each of these basic terms (meaning, interpretation, and intention) requires an essay-length treatment that cannot be done here. For current purposes, it suffices to innovate the aforesaid views and proposals commonly assumed. Bear in listen that for the most function the argue over art interpretation proceeds without consensus on how to define these terms, and clarifications announced but when necessary.

2. Anti-Intentionalism

Anti-intentionalism is considered the outset theory of interpretation to emerge in the analytic tradition. It is normally seen every bit affiliated with the New Criticism movement that was prevalent in the heart of the twentieth century. The position was initially a reaction confronting biographical criticism, the main idea of which is that the interpreter, to grasp the significant of a work, needs to study the life of the author considering the work is seen as reflecting the author's mental world. This approach led to people considering the author'due south biographical data rather than her work. Literary criticism became criticism of biography, not criticism of literary works. Against this trend, literary critic William 1000. Wimsatt and philosopher Monroe C. Beardsley coauthored a seminal paper "The Intentional Fallacy" in 1946, marking the starting indicate of the intention debate. Beardsley later extended his anti-intentionalist stance across the arts in his awe-inspiring book Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism ([1958] 1981a).

a. The Intentional Fallacy

The main idea of the intentional fallacy is that appeal to the artist'southward intention outside the work is fallacious, because the work itself is the verdict of what meaning information technology bears. This contention is based on the anti-intentionalist'southward ontological assumption about works of art.

This underlying supposition is that a work of art enjoys autonomy with respect to meaning and other aesthetically relevant backdrop. Every bit Beardsley's Principle of Autonomy shows, critical statements will in the end need to be tested against the work itself, not against factors exterior information technology. To give Beardsley'south example, whether a statue symbolizes homo destiny depends non on what its maker says just on our being able to make out that theme from the statue on the basis of our cognition of artistic conventions: if the statue shows a human being confined to a muzzle, we may well conclude that the statue indeed symbolizes homo destiny, for past convention the image of confinement fits that alleged theme. The anti-intentionalist principle hence follows: the interpreter should focus on what she can find in the work itself—the internal evidence—rather than on external bear witness, such as the artist'due south biography, to reveal her intentions.

Anti-intentionalism is sometimes chosen conventionalism considering it sees convention every bit necessary and sufficient in determining work-meaning. On this view, the artist'southward intention at all-time underdetermines meaning even when operating successfully. This tin be seen from the famous statement offered by Wimsatt and Beardsley: either the artist's intention is successfully realized in the work, or information technology fails; if the intention is successfully realized in the work, entreatment to external prove of the artist's intention is not necessary (we can detect the intention from the work); if it fails, such appeal becomes insufficient (the intention turns out to be inapplicable to the work). The conclusion is that an appeal to external evidence of the artist's intention is either unnecessary or insufficient. Every bit the second premise of the statement shows, the artist's intention is bereft in determining significant for the reason that convention alone can do the trick. Every bit a result, the overall statement entails the irrelevance of external evidence of the artist'south intention. To think of such evidence as relevant commits the intentional fallacy.

At that place is a second style to formulate the intentional fallacy. Since the artist does non always successfully realize her intention, the inference is invalid from the premise that the artist intended her work to mean p to the decision that the work in question does mean p. Therefore, the term "intentional fallacy" has two layers of significant: normatively, it refers to the questionable principle of interpretation that external bear witness of intent should be appealed to; ontologically, it refers to the fallacious inference from likely intention to piece of work-significant.

b. Beardsley's Speech Deed Theory of Literature

Beardsley at a after point develops an ontology of literature in favor of anti-intentionalism (1981b, 1982). Reviving Plato's imitation theory of fine art, Beardsley claims that fictional works are substantially imitations of illocutionary acts. Briefly put, illocutionary acts are performed past utterances in particular contexts. For case, when a detective, convinced that someone is the killer, points his finger at that person and utters the sentence "you did it," the detective is performing the illocutionary act of accusing someone. What illocutionary human activity is being performed is traditionally construed as jointly determined by the speaker's intention to perform that deed, the words uttered, and the relevant conditions in that particular context. Other examples of illocutionary acts include asserting, warning, castigating, request, and the like.

Literary works can be seen as utterances; that is, texts used in a particular context to perform different illocutionary acts by authors. However, Beardsley claims that in the case of fictional works in particular, the purported illocutionary force will always exist removed so equally to brand the utterance an fake of that illocutionary act. When an attempted act is comparatively performed, it ends upward being represented or imitated. For case, if I say "delight laissez passer me the salt" in my dining room when no i except me is there, I end upward representing (imitating) the illocutionary deed of requesting because there is no uptake from the intended audience. Since the illocutionary act in this case is simply imitated, it qualifies as a fictional act. This is why Beardsley sees fiction as representation.

Consider the uptake condition in the case of fictional works. Such works are not addressed to the audience as a talk is: in that location is no concrete context in which the audience can be readily identified. The uttered text hence loses its illocutionary force and ends up being a representation. Aside from this "address without admission," another obtaining condition for a fictional illocutionary act is the being of not-referring names and descriptions in a fictional work. If an author writes a poem in which she greets the slap-up detective Sherlock Holmes, this greeting volition never obtain, because the name Sherlock Holmes does not refer to any existing person in the world. The greeting volition simply stop up being a representation or a fictional illocution. By parity of reasoning, fictional works end up existence representations of illocutionary acts in that they e'er contain names or descriptions involving events that never accept place.

Now nosotros must ask: by what criterion practise we determine what illocutionary act is represented? It cannot be the speaker or author's intention, considering even if a speaker intends to stand for a particular illocutionary act, she might end up representing another. Since the possibility of failed intention e'er exists, intention would not be an appropriate benchmark. Convention is again invoked to determine the correct illocutionary act being represented. It is true that any do of representing is intentional at the offset in the sense that what is represented is adamant past the representer's intention. Yet, once the connection between a symbol and what it is used to stand for is established, intention is said to be detached from that connection, and deciding the content of a representation becomes a sheer thing of convention.

Since a fictional work is essentially a representation of an insufficiently performed illocutionary human action, determining what it represents does not require united states to become across that incomplete performance, just as determining what a mime is imitating does not require the audience to consider anything outside her performance, such as her intention. What the mime is imitating is completely determined by how we conventionally construe the act being performed. In a similar fashion, when considering what illocutionary human action is represented by a fictional work, the interpreter should rely on internal evidence rather than on external bear witness of authorial intent to construct the illocutionary act existence represented. If, based on internal information, a story reads like a castigation of state of war, it is suitably seen as a representation of that illocutionary deed. The conclusion is that the author's intention plays no office in fixing the content of a fictional work.

Lastly, it is worth mentioning that Beardsley's attitude toward nonfictional works is clashing. Evidently, his speech human action argument applies to fictional works only, and he accepts that nonfictional works tin can be 18-carat illocutions. This category of works tends to have a more identifiable audience, who is hence non addressed without access. With illocutions, Beardsley continues to argue for an anti-intentionalist view of significant according to which the utterer's intention does not decide meaning. But his accepting nonfictional works as illocutions opens the door to considerations of external or contextual factors that become against his earlier stance, which is globally anti-intentionalist.

c. Notable Objections and Replies

1 immediate business organization with anti-intentionalism is whether convention alone tin signal to a single significant (Hirsch, 1967). The common reason why people debate nearly interpretation is precisely that the work itself does not offer sufficient testify to disambiguate meaning. Very often a work can sustain multiple meanings and the problem of option prompts some people to entreatment to the artist's intention. It does not seem plausible to say that one tin can assign only a single meaning to works similar Ulysses or Picasso'due south abstract paintings if one concentrates solely on internal bear witness. To this objection, Beardsley (1970) insists that, in most cases, entreatment to the coherence of the work can eventually leave us with a single correct interpretation.

A second serious objection to anti-intentionalism is the case of irony (Hirsch, 1976, pp. 24–5). It seems reasonable to say that whether a work is ironic depends on if its creator intended it to be so. For instance, based on internal evidence, many people took Daniel Defoe's pamphlet The Shortest Way with the Dissenters to be genuinely against the Dissenters upon its publication. However, the only ground for saying that the pamphlet is ironic seems to exist Defoe's intention. If irony is a crucial component of the work, ignoring it would fail to respect the work's identity. It follows that irony cannot exist grounded in internal show lone. Beardsley's answer (1982, pp. 203–7) is that irony must offer the possibility of understanding. If the artist cannot imagine anyone taking it ironically, there would be no reason to believe the work to exist ironic.

However, the problem of irony is only office of a bigger business concern that challenges the irrelevance of external factors to interpretation. Many factors present at the time of the work'southward cosmos seem to play a key role in shaping a piece of work'due south identity and content. Missing out on these factors would lead usa to misidentifying the work (and hence to misinterpreting it).

For case, a work volition not be seen every bit revolutionary unless the interpreter knows something nearly the contemporaneous artistic tradition: ignoring the piece of work's innovation amounts to accepting that the work tin can lose its revolutionary graphic symbol while remaining self-identical. If we see this grapheme as identity-relevant, we should then take it into consideration in our interpretation. The aforementioned line of thinking goes for other identity-conferring contextual factors, such as the social-historical weather condition and the relations the piece of work bears to contemporaneous or prior works. The present view is thus chosen ontological contextualism to foreground the ontological merits that the identity and content of a work of fine art are in part determined by the relations information technology bears to its context of product.

Contextualism leads to an important distinction between work and text in the case of literature. In a nutshell: a text is not context-dependent but a piece of work is. The anti-intentionalist stance thus leads the interpreter to consider texts rather than works considering it rejects considerations of external or contextual factors. The same distinction goes for other art forms when we describe a comparing between an artistic product considered in its brute form and in its context of cosmos. For convenience, the word "work" is used throughout with notes on whether contextualism is taken or not.

As a reply to the contextualist objection, it has been argued (Davies, 2005) that Beardsley'due south position allows for contextualism. If this is disarming, the contextualist criticism of anti-intentionalism would non be conclusive.

3. Value-Maximizing Theory

a. Overview

The value-maximizing theory can exist viewed as beingness derived from anti-intentionalism. Its core claim is that the primary aim of fine art interpretation is to offering interpretations that maximize the value of a work. At that place are at least 2 versions of the maximizing position distinguished by the commitment to contextualism. When the maximizing position is committed to contextualism, the constraint on estimation volition exist convention plus context (Davies, 2007); otherwise, the constraint will exist convention merely, as endorsed by anti-intentionalism (Goldman, 2013).

Every bit indicated, the give-and-take "maximize" does not imply monism. That is, the nowadays position does not merits that there can be simply a single way to maximize the value of a piece of work of fine art. On the reverse, information technology seems reasonable to assume that in most cases the interpreter tin envisage several readings to bring out the value of the piece of work. For example, Kafka's Metamorphosis has generated a number of rewarding interpretations, and information technology is difficult to argue for a single best amongst them. Every bit long as an interpretation is revealing or insightful nether the relevant interpretative constraints, we may count it every bit value-maximizing. Such being the case, the value-maximizing theory may exist relabelled the "value-enhancing" or "value-satisfying" theory.

Given this pluralist picture, the maximizer, unlike the anti-intentionalist, will need to accept the indeterminacy thesis that convention (and context, if she endorses contextualism) alone does not guarantee the unambiguity of the work. This allows the maximizing position to featherbed the challenge posed past said thesis, rendering it a more flexible position than anti-intentionalism in regard to the number of legitimate interpretations.

Encapsulating the maximizing position in a few words: it holds that the primary aim of art interpretation is to enhance appreciative satisfaction by identifying interpretations that bring out the value of a work within reasonable limits ready by convention (and context).

b. Notable Objections and Replies

The bodily intentionalist volition maintain that figurative features such as irony and allusion must be analysed intentionalistically. The maximizer with contextualist delivery can counter this objection by dealing with intentions more than sophisticatedly. If the relevant features are identity conferring, they will exist respected and accepted in interpretation. In this example, whatever interpretation that ignores the intended characteristic ends upwards misidentifying the work. Simply if the relevant features are not identity conferring, more room volition be left for the interpreter to consider them. The intended feature tin exist ignored if information technology does not add together to the value of the work. By contrast, where such a feature is non intended but can exist put in the piece of work, the interpreter tin can yet build it into the interpretation if it is value enhancing.

The most important objection to the maximizing view has information technology that the present position is in danger of turning a mediocre work into a masterpiece. Ed Wood'south film Plan nine from Outer Infinite is the most discussed example. Many people consider this piece of work to be the worst film ever made. Even so, interpreted from a postmodern perspective as satire—which is presumably a value-enhancing interpretation—would turn it into a classic.

The maximizer with contextualist leanings tin answer that the postmodern reading fails to identify the film as authored by Wood (Davies, 2007, p, 187). Postmodern views were not available in Forest'due south time, so it was incommunicable for the movie to be created as such. Identifying the film as postmodernist amounts to anachronism that disrespects the work's identity. The moral of this instance is that the maximizer does non blindly raise the value of a work. Rather, the work to be interpreted needs to be contextualized showtime to ensure that subsequent attributions of aesthetic value are done in light of the truthful and fair presentation of the work.

4. Actual Intentionalism

Contra anti-intentionalism, actual intentionalism maintains that the artist's intention is relevant to interpretation. The position comes in at least three forms, giving unlike weights to intention. The absolute version claims that work-meaning is fully determined by the artist's intention; the extreme version claims that the work ends up being meaningless when the artist's intention is incompatible with it; and the moderate version claims that either the artist's intention determines pregnant or—if this fails—meaning is determined instead by convention (and context, if contextualism is endorsed).

a. Absolute Version

Accented actual intentionalism claims that a work means whatsoever its creator intends it to hateful. Put otherwise, information technology sees the artist's intention as the necessary and sufficient condition for a work's meaning. This position is often dubbed Humpty-Dumptyism with reference to the character Humpty-Dumpty in Through the Looking-Glass. This character tries to convince Alice that he can make a discussion mean what he chooses it to hateful. This unsettling determination is supported by the argument about intentionless significant: a mark (or a sequence of marks) cannot have meaning unless it is produced by an agent capable of intentional activities; therefore, meaning is identical to intention.

It seems plausible to abandon the idea that marks on the sand are a poem once we know they were caused by accident. But this at best proves that intention is the necessary condition for something's being meaningful; it does non prove further that what something means is what the agent intended information technology to mean. In other words, the argument about intentionless meaning does a improve chore in showing that intention is an indispensable ingredient for meaningfulness than in showing that intention infallibly determines the meaning conveyed.

b. Farthermost Version

To avert Humpty-Dumptyism, the farthermost actual intentionalist rejects the view that the artist's intention infallibly determines piece of work-significant and accepts the indeterminacy thesis that convention lone does not guarantee a unmarried evident meaning to exist constitute in a work. The extreme intentionalist claims farther that the pregnant of the piece of work is fixed by the creative person's intention if her intention identifies i of the possible meanings sustained by the work; otherwise, the work ends up being meaningless (Hirsch, 1967). Better put, the extreme intentionalist sees intention as the necessary rather than sufficient condition for piece of work-meaning.

Bated from the unsatisfactory result that a work becomes meaningless when the artist's intention fails, the present position faces a dilemma when dealing with the case of figurative linguistic communication (Nathan, in Iseminger (1992)). Take irony for case. The first horn of the dilemma is equally follows: Constrained by linguistic conventions, the range of possible meanings has to include the negation of the literal meaning in order for the intended irony to be constructive. But this results in accented intentionalism: every expression would exist ironic as long equally the author intends it to exist. But—this is the second horn—if the range of possible meanings does not include the negation of literal pregnant, the expression simply becomes meaningless in that there is no appropriate significant possible for the author to actualize. Information technology seems that a broader notion of convention is needed to explain figurative language. But if the farthermost intentionalist makes that move, her intentionalist position volition exist undermined, for the author'southward intention would be given a less important role than convention in such cases. However, this problem does non arise when the actual intentionalist is committed to contextualism, for in that instance the contextual factors that make the intended irony possible will be taken into account.

c. Moderate Version

Though there are several different versions of moderate actual intentionalism, they share the common ground that when the artist'south intention fails, meaning is fixed instead by convention and context. (Whether all moderate actual intentionalists take context into account is controversial and this article volition not dig into this controversy for reasons of space.) That is, when the artist'southward intention is successful, it determines meaning; otherwise, meaning is determined by convention plus context (Carroll, 2001; Stecker, 2003; Livingston, 2005).

As seen, an intention is successful and so long equally it identifies one of the possible meanings sustained past the work fifty-fifty if the meaning identified is less plausible than other candidates. But what exactly is the interpreter doing when she identifies that meaning? It is reasonable to say that the interpreter does not demand to define all the possible meanings and see if there is a fit. Rather, all she needs to do is to come across whether the intended meaning can be read in accordance with the work. This is why the moderate intentionalist puts the success condition in terms of compatibility: an intention is successful so long equally the intended significant is compatible with the work. The fact that a certain meaning is uniform with the piece of work means that the work can sustain information technology as i of its possible meanings.

Unfortunately, the notion of compatibility seems to permit strange cases in which an insignificant intention tin determine work-pregnant as long as information technology is not explicitly rejected by the relevant interpretative constraint. For example, if Agatha Christie reveals that Hercule Poirot is actually a smart Martian in disguise, the moderate intentionalist would need to have it because this proclamation of intention can still be said to be uniform with the text in the sense that it is non rejected by textual evidence. To avert this bad consequence, compatibility needs to be qualified.

The moderate intentionalist then analyses compatibility in terms of the meshing condition, which refers to a sufficient degree of coherence between the content of the intention and the piece of work's rhetorical patterns. An intention is compatible with the work in the sense that it meshes well with the work. The Martian case will hence be ruled out by the meshing status because it does non engage sufficiently with the narrative even if it is non explicitly rejected by textual evidence. The meshing condition is a minimal or weak success status in that it does not require the intention to mesh with every textual feature. A sufficient corporeality will do, though the moderate intentionalist admits that the line is not always piece of cake to describe. With this weak standard for success, it tin can happen that the interpreter is non able to discern the intended pregnant in the work before she learns of the creative person'south intention.

There is a second kind of success condition which adopts a stronger standard (Stecker, 2003; Davies, 2007, pp. 170–1). This standard for success states that an intention is successful but in case the intended meaning, amongst the possible meanings sustained past the piece of work, is the i virtually likely to secure uptake from a well-backgrounded audience (with contextual knowledge and all). For example, if a work of art, within the limits set by convention and context, affords interpretations 10, y, and z, and ten is more readily discerned than the other two by the advisable audition, then ten is the meaning of the work.

These accounts of the success condition answer a notable objection to moderate intentionalism. This objection claims that moderate intentionalism faces an epistemic dilemma (Trivedi, 2001). Consider an epistemic question: how do nosotros know whether an intention is successfully realized? Presumably, we figure out work-meaning and the artist's intention respectively and independently of each other. And and so nosotros compare the two to see if there is a fit. Still, this move is redundant: if we tin can figure out work-meaning independently of bodily intention, why do nosotros demand the latter? And if work-meaning cannot be independently obtained, how can we know it is a case where intentions are successfully realized and not a instance where intentions failed? It follows that appeal to successful intention results in back-up or indeterminacy.

The get-go horn of the dilemma assumes that work-meaning tin can exist obtained independently of knowledge of successful intention, but this is false for moderate intentionalists, for they acknowledge that in many cases the work presents ambiguity that cannot be resolved solely in virtue of internal bear witness. The moderate intentionalist rejects the second horn past claiming that they practise non determine the success of an intention by comparing independently obtained piece of work-significant with the artist's intention (Stecker, 2010, pp. 154–5). As already discussed, moderate intentionalists suggest different success conditions that do not appeal to the identity between the creative person's intention and work-pregnant. Moderate intentionalists adopting the weak standard agree that success is defined by the degree of meshing; those who adopt the strong standard maintain that success is defined by the audience's ability to grasp the intention. Neither requires the interpreter to identify a piece of work's significant independently of the artist's intention.

d. Objections to Actual Intentionalism

The virtually ordinarily raised objection is the epistemic worry, which asks: is intention knowable? It seems impossible for one to really know others' mental states, and the epistemic gap in this respect is thus unbridgeable. Actual intentionalists tend to dismiss this worry every bit insignificant and maintain that in many contexts (daily conversation or historical investigations) we have no difficulty in discerning another person's intention (Carroll, 2009, pp. 71–5). In that case, why would things all of a sudden stand differently when information technology comes to fine art interpretation? This is not to say that we succeed on every occasion of interpretation, but that we do so in an amazingly large number of cases. That beingness said, we should not pass up the entreatment to intention solely considering of the occasional failure.

Some other objection is the publicity paradox (Nathan, 2006). The chief idea is this: when someone S conveys something p by a production of an object O for public consumption, there is a second-order intention that the audience need not go beyond O to achieve p; that is, there is no need to consult Due south'southward first-club intentions to understand O. Therefore, when an artist creates a work for public consumption, there is a second-society intention that her first-order intentions not be consulted, otherwise information technology would indicate the failure of the artist. Actual intentionalism hence leads to the paradoxical merits that nosotros should and should not consult the artist'due south intentions.

The actual intentionalist's response (Stecker, 2010, pp. 153–iv) is this: not all artists have the second-order intention in question. If this premise is false, then the publicity statement becomes unsound. Even if information technology were true, the argument would still exist invalid, because information technology confuses the intention that the artist intends to create something standing alone with the intention that her first-social club intention need non be consulted. The paradox will not hold if this stardom is made.

Lastly, many criticisms are directed at a pop statement amidst actual intentionalists: the conversation argument (Carroll, 2001; Jannotta, 2014). An analogy betwixt conversation and fine art interpretation is drawn, and actual intentionalists claim that if we accept that art estimation is a form of conversation, we need to accept bodily intentionalism as the right prescriptive account of interpretation, because the standard goal of an interlocutor in a conversation is to grasp what the speaker intends to say. (This is a premise even anti-intentionalists have, but they plain decline the further claim that fine art interpretation is conversational. Come across Beardsley, 1970, ch.i.) This analogy has been severely criticized (Dickie, 2006; Nathan, 2006; Huddleston, 2012). The greatest disanalogy between chat and art is that the latter is more like a monologue delivered by the artist rather than an interchange of ideas.

One way to meet the monologue objection is to specify more than clearly the function of the conversational interest. In fact, the bodily intentionalist claims that the conversational interest should constrain other interests such every bit the aesthetic interest. In other words, other interests can exist reconciled or work with the conversational involvement. Take the case of the hermeneutics of suspicion for example. Hermeneutics of suspicion is a skeptical attitude—frequently heavily politicized—adopted toward the explicit opinion of a piece of work. Interpretations based on the hermeneutics of suspicion have to be constrained by the artist's non-ironic intention in order for them to count as legitimate interpretations. For case, in attributing racist tendencies to Jules Verne's Mysterious Island, in which the black slave Nib is portrayed as docile and superstitious, nosotros need to suppose that the tendencies are not ironic; otherwise, the suspicious reading becomes inappropriate. In this example, the creative conversation does not end up being a monologue, for the suspicious hermeneut listens and understands Verne before responding with the suspicious reading, which is constrained past the conversational interest. A conversational interchange is hence completed.

5. Hypothetical Intentionalism

a. Overview

A compromise between bodily intentionalism and anti-intentionalism is hypothetical intentionalism, the cadre claim of which is that the right meaning of a work is determined by the best hypothesis about the artist's intention fabricated by a selected audition. The aim of interpretation is and so to hypothesize what the artist intended when creating the work from the perspective of the qualified audience (Tolhurst, 1979; Levinson, 1996).

Two points telephone call for attending. First, it is hypothesis—not truth—that matters. This means that a hypothesis of the actual intention volition never be trumped by knowledge of that very intention. 2nd, the membership of the audition is crucial because it determines the kind of evidence legitimate for the interpreter to utilise.

A 1979 proposal (Tolhurst) suggests that the relevant audience be singled out by the artist's intention, that is, the audience intended to be addressed by the artist. Work-pregnant is thus adamant past the intended audience's best hypothesis virtually the creative person'southward intention. This means that the interpreter will demand to equip herself with the relevant beliefs and groundwork knowledge of the intended audience in social club to brand the best hypothesis. Put another way, hypothetical intentionalism focuses on the audition's uptake of an utterance addressed to them. This beingness so, what the audience relies on in comprehending the utterance volition be based on what she knows about the utterer on that detail occasion. Following this contextualist line of thinking, the meaning of Jonathan Swift's A Pocket-size Proposal will not exist the suggestion that the poor in Ireland might ease their economical pressure by selling their children as food to the rich; rather, given the groundwork knowledge of Swift's intended audition, the all-time hypothesis about the author'south intention is that he intended the work to be a satire that criticizes the heartless attitude toward the poor and Irish gaelic policy in general.

However, there is a serious problem with the notion of an intended audience. If the intended audience is an extremely small group possessing esoteric knowledge of the artist, meaning becomes a private affair, for the work can only exist properly understood in terms of private information shared between artist and audition, and this results in something shut to Humpty-Dumptyism, which is characteristic of absolute intentionalism.

To cope with this problem, the hypothetical intentionalist replaces the concept of an intended audience with that of an platonic or appropriate audience. Such an audience is not necessarily targeted by the artist's intention and is ideal in the sense that its members are familiar with the public facts about the creative person and her work. In other words, the ideal audience seeks to anchor the work in its context of creation based on public bear witness. This avoids the danger of interpreting the piece of work on the basis of private evidence.

The hypothetical intentionalist is aware that in some cases there will be competing interpretations which are equally good. An aesthetic criterion is then introduced to adjudicate between these hypotheses. The aesthetic consideration comes as a tie breaker: when we reach 2 or more than epistemically best hypotheses, the one that makes the work artistically better should win.

Another notable distinction introduced by hypothetical intentionalism is that betwixt semantic and categorial intention (Levinson, 1996, pp. 188–9). The kind of intention we take been discussing is semantic: it is the intention by which an creative person conveys her message in the piece of work. Past contrast, categorial intention is the artist's intention to categorize her production, either as a piece of work of fine art, a certain artform (such as Romantic literature), or a particular genre (such equally lyric poetry). Categorial intention indirectly affects a work'due south semantic content because it determines how the interpreter conceptualizes the work at the central level. For case, if a text is taken as a grocery list rather than an experimental story, we will interpret it as saying zippo across the named grocery items. For this reason, the artist's categorial intention should be treated as amongst the contextual factors relevant to her work's identity. This move is oft adopted by theorists endorsing contextualism, such as maximizers or moderate intentionalists.

b. Notable Objections and Replies

Hypothetical intentionalism has received many criticisms and challenges that merit mention. A frequently expressed worry is that it seems odd to stick to a hypothesis when newly found testify proves information technology to exist simulated (Carroll, 2001, pp. 208–9). If an artist's private diary is located and reveals that our best hypothesis about her intention regarding her work is false, why should we cling to that hypothesis if the newly revealed intention meshes well with the work? Hypothetical intentionalism implausibly implies that warranted assertibility constitutes truth.

The hypothetical intentionalist clarifies her position (Levinson, 2006, p. 308) by maxim that warranted assertibility does not establish the truth for the utterer'southward meaning, just information technology does constitute the truth for utterance significant. The ideal audience'due south best hypothesis constitutes utterance meaning fifty-fifty if it is designed to infer the utterer'southward meaning.

Another troublesome objection states that hypothetical intentionalism collapses into the value-maximizing theory, for, when making the best hypothesis of what the artist intended, the interpreter inevitably attributes to the artist the intention to produce a piece with the highest degree of artful value that the piece of work can sustain (Davies, 2007, pp. 183–84). That is, the epistemic criterion for determining the best hypothesis is inseparable from the aesthetic benchmark.

In reply, it is claimed that this objection may stem from the impression that an artist unremarkably aims for the best; however, this does non imply that she would conceptualize and intend the artistically best reading of the work. It follows that it is not necessary that the all-time reading be what the artist almost likely intended even if she could accept intended it. The objector replies that, still, the situation in which we have two epistemically plausible readings while one is inferior cannot arise, because we would prefer the inferior reading only when the superior reading is falsified by show.

The third objection is that the distinction between public and private evidence is blurry (Carroll, 2001, p. 212). Is public evidence published show? Does published information from private sources count equally public? The respond from the hypothetical intentionalist emphasizes that this is non a distinction betwixt published and unpublished data (Levinson, 2006, p. 310). The relevant public context should be reconstrued equally what the artist appears to have wanted the audience to know about the circumstances of the work's creation. This means that if it appears that the artist did not want to make certain proclamations of intent known to the audience, and so this evidence, even if published at a afterwards point, does not constitute the public context to exist considered for interpretation.

Finally, two notable counterexamples to hypothetical intentionalism have been proposed (Stecker, 2010, pp. 159–60). The first counterexample is that West means p merely p is not intended by the creative person and the audience is justified in believing that p is not intended. In this instance hypothetical intentionalism falsely implies that West does not hateful p. For example, it is famously known amid readers of Sherlock Holmes adventures that Dr. Watson's war wound appears in two different locations. On one occasion the wound is said to exist on his arm, while on another it is on his thigh. In other words the Holmes story fictionally asserts impossibility regarding Watson's wound. But given the realistic fashion of the Holmes adventures, the best hypothesis of authorial intent in this example would deny that the impossibility is function of the meaning of the story, which is apparently fake.

However, the hypothetical intentionalist would not maintain that W means p, because p is non the all-time hypothesis. She would not claim that the Holmes story fictionally asserts impossibility regarding Watson'southward wound, for the all-time hypothesis made by the ideal reader would exist that Watson has the wound somewhere on his body—his arm or thigh, but exactly where we do not know. It is a fault to presuppose that W means p without following the strictures imposed by hypothetical intentionalism to properly accomplish p.

The second counterexample to hypothetical intentionalism is the case where the audience is justified in assertive that p is intended past the artist but in fact W ways q; the audience would and so falsely conclude that Westward means p. Once more, what W means is determined by the ideal audience'south best hypothesis based on convention and context, not by what the work literally asserts. The meaning of the work is the product of a prudent assessment of the full prove available.

6. Hypothetical Intentionalism and the Hypothetical Creative person

a. Overview

There is a 2nd multifariousness of hypothetical intentionalism that is based on the concept of a hypothetical artist. More often than not speaking, it maintains that interpretation is grounded on the intention suitably attributed by the interpreter to a hypothetical or imagined artist. This version of hypothetical intentionalism is sometimes chosen fictionalist intentionalism or postulated authorism. The theoretical apparatus of a hypothetical artist can be traced dorsum to Wayne Berth'due south account of the "implied writer," in which he suggests that the critic should focus on the writer nosotros can make out from the work instead of on the historical author, considering at that place is frequently a gap between the two.

Though proponents of the present make of intentionalism disagree on the number of acceptable interpretations and on what kind of evidence is legitimate, they agree that the interpreter ought to concentrate on the advent of the work. If it appears, based on internal evidence (and mayhap contextual information if contextualism is endorsed), that the artist intends the work to mean p, then p is the correct interpretation of the work. The artist in question is non the historical artist; rather, it is an artist postulated by the audience to be responsible for the intention made out from, or implied by, the work. For example, if there is an anti-war attitude detected in the work, the intention to castigate state of war should exist attributed to the postulated artist, not to the historical artist. The motivation backside this motility is to maintain piece of work-centered interpretation but avert the fallacious reasoning that whatever we find in the work is intended by the real creative person.

Inheriting the spirit of hypothetical intentionalism, fictionalist intentionalism aims to make interpretation work-based merely author-related at the same fourth dimension. The biggest deviation between the two stances is that, as said, fictionalist intentionalism does not entreatment to the actual or real artist, thereby fugitive any criticisms arising from hypothesizing nearly the real artist such as that the best hypothesis about the real artist'southward intention should be abandoned when compelling evidence against it is obtained.

b. Notable Objections and Replies

The start concern with fictionalist intentionalism is that constructing a historical variant of the actual artist sounds suspiciously like hypothesizing nearly her (Stecker, 1987). But there is still a departure. "Hypothesizing about the actual artist," or more than accurately, "hypothesizing the actual artist's intention," would be a characterization of hypothetical intentionalism rather than fictionalist intentionalism. The latter does not track the actual creative person'southward intention but constructs a virtual one. Equally shown, fictionalist intentionalism, unlike hypothetical intentionalism, is allowed to whatsoever criticisms resulting from ignoring the actual artist's proclamation of her intention.

A 2d objection criticizes fictionalist intentionalism for non being able to distinguish between different histories of creative processes for the same textual appearance (Livingston, 2005, pp. 165–69). For example, suppose a work that appears to be produced with a well-conceived scheme did result from that kind of scheme; suppose further that a second piece of work that appears the same actually emerged from an uncontrolled process. Then, if we follow the strictures of fictionalist intentionalism, the interpretations we produce for these two works would turn out to be the same, for based on the aforementioned appearance the hypothetical artists we construct in both cases would exist identical. But these two works have different artistic histories and the difference in question seems too crucial to be ignored.

The objection here fails to consider the subtlety of reality-dependent appearances (Walton, 2008, ch. 12). For example, suppose the exhibit note beside a painting tells us it was created when the painter got heavily boozer. Whatever well-organized feature in the work that appears to result from careful manipulation by the painter might now either look matted or structured in an eerie mode depending on the feature's actual presentation. Compare this scenario to another where a (almost) visually duplicate counterpart is exhibited in the museum with the exhibit note revealing that the painter spent a long flow crafting the work. In this second instance the audition's perception of the work is non very likely to be the aforementioned as that in the first case. This shows how the apparent creative person account can still discriminate between (appearances of) unlike creative histories of the same artistic presentation.

Finally, there is often the qualm that fictionalist intentionalism ends upwardly postulating phantom entities (hypothetical creators) and phantom actions (their intendings). The fictional intentionalist tin answer that she is giving descriptions only of appearances instead of quantifying over hypothetical artists or their actions.

7. Conclusion

From the above discussion we tin notice two major trends in the debate. Offset, most late 20th century and 21st century participants are committed to the contextualist ontology of fine art. The relevance of fine art'southward historical context, since its start philosophical appearance in Arthur Danto's 1964 essay "The Artworld," continues to influence analytic theories of art interpretation. At that place is no sign of this trend diminishing. In Noël Carroll'south 2016 survey article on interpretation, the contextualist basis is yet causeless.

2d, actual intentionalism remains the most popular position among all. Many substantial monographs accept been written in this century to defend the position (Stecker, 2003; Livingston, 2005; Carroll, 2009; Stock 2017). This intentionalist prevalence probably results from the influence of H. P. Grice'southward piece of work on the philosophy of language. And once again, this tendency, like the contextualist faddy, is still ongoing. And if we see intentionalism as an umbrella term that encompasses not only actual intentionalism but also hypothetical intentionalism and probably fictionalist intentionalism, the influence of intentionalism and its related emphasis on the concept of an artist or author will be even stronger. This presents an interesting dissimilarity with the trend in mail service-structuralism that tends to downplay authorial presence in theories of interpretation, as embodied in the author-is-dead thesis championed by Barthes and Foucoult (Lamarque, 2009, pp. 104–15).

8. References and Further Reading

  • Beardsley, M. C. (1970). The possibility of criticism. Detroit, MI: Wayne Land University Press.

  • Contains four philosophical essays on literary criticism. The first two are among Beardsley's nearly important contributions to the philsoophy of estimation.

  • Beardsley, One thousand. C. (1981a). Aesthetics: Problems in the philosophy of criticism (2nd ed.). Indianapolis, IN: Hackett.

  • A comprehensive book on philosophical issues across the arts and also a powerful statement of anti-intentionalism.

  • Beardsley, M. C. (1981b). Fiction as representation. Synthese, 46, 291–313.

  • Presents the spoken language act theory of literature.

  • Beardsley, K. C. (1982). The aesthetic point of view: Selected essays. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

  • Contains the essay "Intentions and Interpretations: A Fallacy Revived," in which Beardsley applies his spoken communication act theory to the interpretation of fictional works.

  • Booth, Due west. C. (1983). The rhetoric of fiction (2nd ed.). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

  • Contains the original account of the implied writer.

  • Carroll, N. (2001). Across aesthetics: Philosophical essays. New York, NY: Cambridge Academy Press.

  • Contains in detail Carroll's conversation argument, word on the hermenutics of suspicion, defence of moderate intentionalism, and criticism of hypothetical intentionalism.

  • Carroll, N. (2009). On criticism. New York, NY: Routledge.

  • An engaging book on creative evaluation and interpretation.

  • Carroll, N., & Gibson, J. (Eds.). (2016). The Routledge companion to philosophy of literature. New York, NY: Routledge.

  • Anthologizes Carroll's survey article on the intention contend.

  • Currie, G. (1990). The nature of fiction. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

  • Contains a defence force of fictionalist intentionalism.

  • Currie, 1000. (1991). Work and text. Heed, 100, 325–twoscore.

  • Presents how a commitment to contextualism leads to an important stardom betwixt work and text in the case of literature.

  • Danto, A. C. (1964). The artworld. Journal of Philosophy, 61, 571–84.

  • First newspaper to draw attention to the relevance of a piece of work's context of production.

  • Davies, Southward. (2005). Beardsley and the autonomy of the work of art. Journal of Aesthetics and Fine art Criticism, 63, 179–83.

  • Argues that Beardsley is really a contextualist.

  • Davies, Due south. (2007). Philosophical perspectives on art. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

  • Office 2 contains Davies' defense of the maximizing position and criticisms of other positions.

  • Dickie, G. (2006). Intentions: Conversations and art. British Journal of Aesthetics, 46, 71–81.

  • Criticizes Carroll'south conversation argument and actual intentionalism.

  • Goldman, A. H. (2013). Philosophy and the novel. Oxford, England: Oxford University Printing.

  • Contains a defence force of the value-maximizing theory without a contextualist commitment.

  • Hirsch, E. D. (1967). Validity in interpretation. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

  • The most representative presentation of extreme intentionalism.

  • Hirsch, E. D. (1976). The aims of interpretation. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

  • Contains a collection of essays expanding Hirsh's views on estimation.

  • Huddleston, A. (2012). The conversation argument for actual intentionalism. British Periodical of Aesthetics, 52, 241–56.

  • A bright criticism of Carroll's conversation argument.

  • Iseminger, Yard. (Ed.). (1992). Intention & interpretation. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.

  • A valuable drove of essays featuring Beardsley's account of the work's autonomy, Knapp and Michaels' absolute intentionalism, Iseminger's extreme intentionalism, Nathan's account of the postulated creative person, Levinson's hypothetical intentionalism, and eight other contributions.

  • Jannotta, A. (2014). Estimation and conversation: A response to Huddleston. British Periodical of Aesthetics, 54, 371–eighty.

  • A defense of the conversation argument.

  • Krausz, M. (Ed.). (2002). Is there a unmarried correct interpretation? Academy Park: Pennsylvania State Academy Press.

  • Another valuable anthology on the intention debate, containing in detail Carroll's defense of moderate intentionalism, Lamarque's criticism of viewing piece of work-significant every bit utterance pregnant.

  • Lamarque, P. (2009). The philosophy of literature. Malden, MA: Blackwell.

  • The third and the fourth capacity hash out analytic theories of estimation along with a disquisitional assessment of the author-is-dead claim.

  • Levinson, J. (1996). The pleasure of aesthetics: Philosophical essays. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

  • The 10th chapter is Levinson'south revised presentation of hypothetical intentionalism and the distinction between semantic and categorial intention.

  • Levinson, J. (2006). Contemplating fine art: Essays in aesthetics. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

  • Contains Levinson's replies to major objections to hypothetical intentionalism.

  • Levinson, J. (2016). Artful pursuits: Essays in philosophy of art. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

  • Contains Levinson'southward updated defense of hypothetical intentionalism and criticism of Livingston's moderate intentionalism.

  • Livingston, P. (2005). Art and intention: A philosophical study. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

  • A thorough discussion on intention, literary ontology, and the trouble of interpretation, with emphases on defending the meshing condition and on the criticisms of the two versions of hypothetical intentionalism.

  • Nathan, D. O. (1982). Irony and the artist's intentions. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 22, 245–56.

  • Criticizes the notion of an intended audition.

  • Nathan, D. O. (2006). Art, meaning, and artist's meaning. In M. Kieran (Ed.), Contemporary debates in aesthetics and the philosophy of fine art (pp. 282–93). Oxford, England: Blackwell.

  • Presents an business relationship of fictionalist intentionalism, a critique of the conversation statement, and a cursory recapitulation of the publicity paradox.

  • Nehamas, A. (1981). The postulated author: Critical monism as a regulative ideal. Critical Inquiry, 8, 133–49.

  • Presents some other version of fictionalist intentionalism.

  • Stecker, R. (1987). 'Apparent, Implied, and Postulated Authors', Philosophy and Literature 11, pp 258-71.

  • Criticizes different versions of fictionalist intentionalism

  • Stecker, R. (2003). Interpretation and construction: Art, speech, and the police force. Oxford, England: Blackwell.

  • A valuable monograph devoted to the intention contend and its related issues such as the ontology of fine art, incompatible interpretations and the application of theories of art interpretation to law. The book defends moderate intentionalism in detail.

  • Stecker, R. (2010). Aesthetics and the philosophy of art: An introduction. Lanham, Dr.: Rowman & Littlefield.

  • Contains a chapter that presents the disjunctive formulation of moderate intentionalism and the ii counterexamples to hypothetical intentionalism.

  • Stecker, R., & Davies, S. (2010). The hypothetical intentionalist'south dilemma: A respond to Levinson. British Journal of Aesthetics, l, 307–12.

  • Counterreplies to Levinson's replies to criticisms of hypothetical intentionalism.

  • Stock, Thousand. (2017). Only imagine: Fiction, estimation, and imagination. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

  • Contains a defense of accented (the author uses the term "extreme") intentionalism.

  • Tolhurst, W. E. (1979). On what a text is and how it means. British Journal of Aesthetics, 19, 3–xiv.

  • The founding document of hypothetical intentionalism.

  • Trivedi, South. (2001). An epistemic dilemma for actual intentionalism. British Journal of Aesthetics, 41, pp. 192–206.

  • Presents an epistemic dilemma for actual intentionalism and defence force of hypothetical intentionalism.

  • Walton, Yard. L. (2008). Marvelous images: On values and the arts. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

  • A drove of essays, including "Categories of Fine art," which might have inspired Levinson's formulation of categorial intention; and "Style and the Products and Processes of Fine art," which is a defense of fictionalist intentionalism in terms of the notion "apparent artist."

  • Wimsatt, Westward. Chiliad., & Beardsley, M. C. (1946). The intentional fallacy. The Sewanee Review, 54, 468–88.

  • The offset thorough presentation of anti-intentionalism, commonly regarded every bit starting point of the intention debate.

Author Data

Szu-Yen Lin
Email: lsy17@ulive.pccu.edu.tw
Chinese Culture University
Taiwan